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Geopolitics or Geobody Politics? 
Understanding the Rise of China and Its 
Actions in the South China Sea
Hiroaki Ataka
The “rise of China,” especially within U.S. academic and policy circles, has been 
increasingly analyzed through a geopolitical lens. Yet geopolitics alone cannot 
account for the complex political mobilization of historical memory and how it 
frames any discussion of peace and cooperation in the region. Drawing on the 
concept of geobody, or how space and people are connected in a biopolitical 
manner, this article examines how the territorial disputes in the South China Sea are 
remaking the identity and interests of China. It develops an alternative theoretical 
understanding of China’s rise that focuses on identity (or geobody) politics, 
and explores the risks involved in a further escalation of tensions for peace and 
cooperation in the area, and in East Asia more generally.
Keywords maritime disputes, South China Sea, China’s “peaceful rise,” identity 
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Introduction
There is no gene for invasion in Chinese people’s blood, and Chinese people will not 
follow the logic that “might is right.” ... China will firmly stick to the path of peaceful 
development. (Xi Jinping 2014)1
China has reclaimed over 2,000 acres, more than all other claimants combined, and 
more than in the entire history of the region.... The United States is deeply concerned 
about the pace and scope of land reclamation in the South China Sea, the prospect of 
further militarisation, as well as the potential for these activities to increase the risk of 
miscalculation or conflict among claimant states. (Ashton Carter 2015)2
An increasingly popular and dominant approach on “the rise of China,” 
especially within U.S. academic and policy circles, is to focus on geopolitics 
Asian Journal of Peacebuilding  Vol. 4  No. 1 (2016): 77-95
doi: 10.18588/201605.00a001 Research Article 
© 2016 The Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul National University
ISSN 2288-2693 Print, ISSN 2288-2707 Online
78 Hiroaki Ataka
(Kaplan 2014; Mead 2014). Typically underpinned by a (neo-)Realist logic that 
rising and status quo powers will inevitably clash, a common theme emerging 
from such analyses is that increasingly strong and rising China is seizing the 
moment to forcefully change the status quo. While differences over the prospect 
of peace and cooperation do remain, even Liberals, who have traditionally 
denounced such an idea, now seem to be adopting the idea that some kind of 
transhistorical logic will inevitably lead the United States (as the status quo 
power) and China (as the rising power) to collide (Liff and Ikenberry 2014). 
Viewed through a geopolitical lens, therefore, Chinese actions in the South China 
Sea are interpreted as an opportunistic projection of raw power; notions such as 
“peaceful rise” or “peaceful development” are merely calculative gestures to buy 
time for further military buildup in the region and beyond, ultimately challenging 
the influence and outreach of the current hegemon. Yet if both governments are 
playing the same strategic game, as suggested by the proponents of geopolitics, 
questions remain as to why Washington and Beijing are sending out such 
seemingly contradicting messages over the South China Sea, as seen from the 
quotes above? And what are the risks involved in a further escalation of tensions 
for peace and cooperation in the region, and in East Asia more generally?
In order to answer these questions, this article argues that a renewed look 
at the identity formation of the Chinese state is necessary to fully understand 
the contrasting signals between the two sides. The limits of geopolitical analysis, 
and the (neo-)Realist theory that underpins it, are that it assumes a solid, 
fixed identity and interest to exist prior to interaction. And with identities and 
interests being equal among all states, it boils down to the distribution of power 
or capabilities (and their calculation) to decide the next action for states. So it 
logically flows from this line of thinking that both the United States and the 
People’s Republic of China are (and should be) calculating in a similar strategic 
fashion, focusing on the changes in relative power, and with the United States 
expecting the ambitions of rising China to expand as their material capabilities 
increase. Indeed, it is seen as natural that Beijing strives to further exert its 
influence in the surrounding region, including the South China Sea. Washington, 
therefore, is signaling that a forceful change of the status quo is not worthwhile 
by strengthening the ties with regional allies in Southeast Asia, thereby ultimately 
trying to alter China’s strategic calculations. In this sense, geopolitical analyses are 
not merely descriptive (what is) but also prescriptive (how it should be) (Kirshner 
2012).
Yet the descriptions/prescriptions that these approaches offer do not provide 
a dynamic view of a state’s identity and interests, leading to fears that the policy 
implications arising from such analyses may not be telling the whole story; they 
can even result in heightened risk of miscalculation or conflict. What if China 
doesn’t “act like a realist” and doesn’t focus solely on the (material) balance of 
power? What if things like domestic politics, nationalism or historical memory 
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do play an integral part in determining the next move, rather than ultimately 
being an irrelevant set of factors that Realists dismiss in understanding Beijing’s 
intentions? Indeed, recently Chinese reactions to the maritime territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea seem to have significantly intensified, as the land 
reclamation projects and the rhetoric surrounding them suggest. It can thus be 
problematic to merely assume a strategic game being played on the (South)East 
Asian chessboard, since the players might be presupposing a different logic to the 
game being played, or even a different game altogether (Nye 2011).
By contrast, this article argues that an alternative approach to identity 
formation of the Chinese state is necessary, one that examines how political 
practices such as securing borders can in turn constitute the state’s identity. 
Critical Security and Border Studies imply that borders are (and should be seen 
as) constitutive of political life—as historically contingent, politically charged, 
and dynamic phenomena. Drawing on the concept of geobody, or how space 
and people are connected in a biopolitical manner, this article suggests how 
the territorial disputes and its associated practices in the South China Sea are 
remaking the identity, and consequently interests, of China. It points out that 
intensified territorial disputes may lead to further geobody politics in China and 
throughout the region, distorting the genuine strategic game of pursuit of political 
and economic interests as suggested by the geopolitical view, thereby increasing 
the possibilities for miscalculation or conflict. This article therefore attempts 
to develop an alternative theoretical understanding of the rise of China and its 
implications for territorial disputes in the South China Sea, one that focuses on 
identity (or geobody) politics, which supplements the dominant geopolitical 
analysis.
The article is structured as follows. First, the geopolitical view on the rise of 
China and its actions in the South China Sea is outlined, while looking at some 
of the limits of such analysis. It will be suggested that a fresh look at the identity 
formation of the Chinese state is necessary to fully understand its position 
on the maritime disputes in the region. Second, an alternative approach to 
understanding China’s rise is introduced, focusing on its identity political aspects. 
Drawing on the recent “practice turn” in Critical Security Studies and insights 
from Critical Border Studies, it will be pointed out that the act of maintaining its 
borders is in itself constitutive of the state and its identity. The notion of “geobody 
politics” is then introduced to highlight how the intensified territorial disputes 
and their associated practices are instead forming the identity of the Chinese 
state. Having outlined both the geopolitical and geobody political view of the rise 
of China, the third section explores theoretically the risks involved in a further 
escalation of tensions. The conclusion follows on to outline what the alternative 
theoretical understanding tells us about the prospects for peace and cooperation 
in the region and in East Asia more generally. 
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“Peaceful Rise” of China? Geopolitical View and its Limits
The implications of the rapid rise of China over the last 30 years, and whether 
it will inevitably lead to a clash with the dominant great powers, particularly 
the United States, has been a recurring theme within both academic and policy 
circles. Within the contours of such debates, one area that has attracted heated 
discussion concerns the question of China’s new assertiveness (Johnston 2013; 
Chen, Pu, and Johnston 2013). According to Alastair Iain Johnston, assertiveness 
refers to “a form of assertive diplomacy that explicitly threatens to impose 
costs on another actor that are clearly higher than before” (Johnston 2013, 10). 
It has been argued that the 2008 global financial crisis was a turning point in 
the shifting balance of power from the West to the East, particularly to China 
(Christensen 2015). The increased influence of BRICS, with its own summit and 
development bank, as well as the much discussed establishment of the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank, are just a few examples of this shift to the East.
Yet the most typical manifestation of China’s assertive policy is its actions in 
the South China Sea (Yahuda 2013). These waters have long been a flashpoint, 
demonstrated by China’s seizure of the Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1974 
and again, in 1988, when they clashed over the Spratly Islands. Yet renewed 
Chinese efforts since 2012 to exert its influence over most of the South China 
Sea have triggered concerns and responses from neighboring countries and the 
wider world (Tri and Collin 2014). Despite the fact that Vietnam, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei all have overlapping maritime territorial claims, 
it has been the Chinese claim covering almost all of the South China Sea—the 
so-called nine-dash line—that has been the most contentious.3 After the Sino-
Philippine maritime standoff in the Scarborough Shoal, in April 2012, Beijing 
stepped up efforts to consolidate its territorial claims by formally creating Sansha 
City (located on Woody Island or Yongxing Dao, one of the disputed formations 
in the Paracels) to administratively oversee its territory in the region. The Chinese 
government has sought to reinforce such maritime claims by representing 
most of the South China Sea as an integral part of its sovereign territory on its 
official map, by moving the center of the map further south and depicting itself 
as a maritime power (Tharoor 2014). The most recent case of such Chinese 
provocations came in the form of intensified land reclamation activities in the 
disputed Paracel and Spratly island chains, catching worldwide media attention 
in April 2015. It has been feared that the consolidation of such Chinese territorial 
claims may lead to the “Finlandization” of Southeast Asia (Kaplan 2014), while 
some even argue for “a kind of suzerainty” in the (re)making (Majid 2014, 401).
These recent developments in the South China Sea have given renewed 
impetus to the U.S. debates on the rise of China. Unsurprisingly, the most vocal 
assessments have come from the Realists who focus on geopolitics, arguing that 
the rise of a new great power (China) will inevitably lead to a clash with the old 
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guard (the United States). For instance, Graham Allison (2012; 2015) poses the 
question: “Can China and the US escape Thucydides’s trap?”4 Drawing on the 
classical narrative of the Peloponnesian War, Allison examines the dangers that 
the two parties face when a rising power rivals a ruling power—as in classical 
Greece with Athens challenging Sparta, or the early twentieth century when 
Germany challenged Great Britain. Analyzing historical cases, the project 
found that over the past 500 years, 12 out of 16 cases of rivalry resulted in war. 
Allison thus concludes that “based on the current trajectory, war between the 
United States and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much 
more likely than recognized at the moment. Indeed, judging by the historical 
record, war is more likely than not” (Allison 2015). In a similar vein, albeit 
more theoretically driven, John Mearsheimer (2014, ch. 10) asks: “Can China 
rise peacefully?” Drawing on offensive realism, Mearsheimer (375-376) argues 
that if China continues to grow, it will strive to become a regional hegemon in 
Asia since overpowering your potential rivals is the only way to ensure survival, 
and also because it offers the best pathway for China to resolve its (remaining) 
difficult territorial disputes on favorable terms. Since the United States will go 
to great lengths to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony, and with 
neighboring countries joining the containment strategy, Mearsheimer concludes 
that a rise of China will inevitably result in intense security competition and, 
potentially, war.5 Furthermore, Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis (2015) 
claim that China is trying to “replace” the United States as the primary power in 
Asia, and the United States therefore needs to balance against China as a rising 
power. 
A common theme running through these observations is that they treat 
the rise and fall of the great powers as a kind of transhistorical reality: the rapid 
rise of China will inevitably lead to increased tensions between the old and new 
hegemons.6 Here, Chinese actions in the South China Sea seemingly support 
the argument that Beijing is pushing for economic interests and/or security 
maximization in the region, and that China “knows what it’s doing.” From such 
views, Chinese actions are interpreted as an opportunistic projection of raw 
power; the self-image as a peacefully rising power is merely a calculated gesture 
to buy time for furthering its “true” intention of a military buildup in (South)East 
Asia.
Sinologists have questioned such analysis, however, arguing that domestic 
Chinese debates on “grand strategy” or “core interests” remain vague at best. For 
instance, Feng Zhang (2012, 339) historically traces whether China has developed 
a coherent grand strategy (i.e., conjunction of national interests and strategic 
ideas) in the reform era (1978-present), and concludes that “today’s China is 
unclear about its international purpose and unable to clarify what it stands for.… 
Vagueness about its values and interests does not help to reassure the world of 
China’s rise.” Similarly, Yaqing Qin (2014) notes that while the “assertive China” 
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discourse has become widespread, it is too simplistic to merely assume that China 
has abandoned its “keeping-a-low-profile” strategy altogether and has adopted 
a “striving-for-achievement” stance.7 Rather than assuming a tectonic shift in 
grand strategy, Qin points out that “continuity through change” is a more realistic 
assessment of Chinese foreign policy, with emphasis on its cultural heritage of 
zhongyong or “taking the middle course.” Jinghan Zeng, Yuefan Xiao, and Shaun 
Breslin (2015, 266) summarize the domestic debate on China’s “core interests,” 
concluding that while there is a consensus of sorts that China is misunderstood, 
and that powerful forces are looking to paint China in a negative light, there is no 
consensus on what exactly the core interests are for China.
Furthermore, it has also been suggested that the Chinese state should not 
be seen as unitary but as fragmented, decentralized and internationalized; it 
could thus be misleading to assume that there is (or must be) a rational and 
unified Chinese response to international affairs, as assumed by the proponents 
of geopolitics outlined above. Nowhere is this more evident than in the South 
China Sea, where various national and subnational government agencies have 
operated without coordination amongst themselves. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs “clearly does not control China’s SCS [South China Sea] policy” (Hameiri 
and Jones 2016, 87). An International Crisis Group report sketches how the 
Bureau of Fisheries Administration of the Agriculture Ministry, China Marine 
Surveillance, provincial governments, the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the 
national oil companies and six law enforcement agencies under four different 
ministries are each pursing their own institutional interests, increasing tensions 
in the region (International Crisis Group 2012, 8-13). This partially explains some 
of the provocative Chinese actions in the disputed waters, such as China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation’s decision to develop energy reserves in the disputed 
waters near the Paracels in May 2011. 
It could therefore be concluded that the very idea of a Chinese “grand 
strategy” to which the geopolitical analysis points is problematic, since it projects 
a view of foreign policy that assumes that a fixed and clearly defined identity 
and interest of a state informs its decisions and behavior. A renewed look at the 
identity formation of the Chinese state is therefore necessary to fully understand 
its actions and intent in the South China Sea.
Geobody Politics: An Alternative View on the Rise of China
Rather than speculating on how China will act based on its “core interests” in the 
South China Sea, or how it will rationally react to the geopolitical environment 
informed by its grand strategy rooted in a solid state identity, a more fruitful 
approach is to examine the process by which such identity is formed and how the 
politics of such identity formation drives the maritime disputes in Southeast Asia. 
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This analysis will therefore reverse the equation by looking at how the political 
practice of securing borders and claiming sovereign territories itself constitutes 
China’s identity and consequently its interests. 
A useful starting point to see how political practices make possible strategic 
interactions (and more generally international relations) is the so-called practice 
turn in IR.8 According to Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot (2011, 6): 
Practices are competent performances. More precisely, practices are socially 
meaningful patterns of action which, in being performed more or less competently, 
simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and 
discourse in and on the material world. Practices, such as marking a linear territorial 
boundary, deterring with nuclear weapons, or finance trading, are not merely 
descriptive “arrows” that connect structure to agency and back, but rather the 
dynamic material and ideational processes that enable structures to be stable or to 
evolve, and agents to reproduce or transform structures.
As patterned actions that are embedded in a particular context and repeated 
over time and space, practice as a focus enables a shift away from the rationalist 
models of action that rely on abstract calculation of interests, towards an 
understanding of how it’s “actually done” on the ground (Bueger and Gadinger 
2015). 
Adler and Pouliot (2011, 7-8) outline five aspects of practice. First, 
practice is a performance; that is, a process of doing something. Practices are 
different from preferences or beliefs, which are expressed, and from discourse 
or institutions, which they instantiate. Second, practice is patterned; it exhibits 
certain regularities over time and space. Practices are repeated. Third, practice 
must be competent in a socially meaningful way. Practices are expected to be 
(though not always) interpreted using similar standards. Fourth, practice rests on 
background knowledge, which it embodies, enacts, and reifies all at once. In other 
words, involved parties need to share an understanding of “how it’s done.” Fifth, 
practice connects the discursive and the material worlds. Therefore, contrary to 
the Realists who consider practice solely as material representation of interests, 
a focus on political practice enables a bottom-up approach to international 
relations, uncovering how it constitutes different dimensions of world politics 
(Pouliot and Cornut 2015).
Such focus on political practice has seen growing salience in the field of 
Critical Security Studies, particularly with regard to border politics.9 Traditional 
theories of international relations take sovereignty, territory and border as 
concepts that emerged historically, but are nonetheless natural. Sovereign 
states and the modern state system are seen as fundamental characteristics of 
“the international,” where borders are treated as simple lines that distinguish 
the sovereign territory of states, dividing the domestic and the international 
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in an unambiguous manner. By contrast, critical approaches view borders as 
constitutive of political life, meaning that the mere practice of maintaining and 
managing borders itself produces the inherent logics of inside/outside, practices 
of inclusion/exclusion, and questions about identity/difference. In other words, 
borders are not given but (re)produced through modes of affirmation and 
contestation; they are not natural, neutral nor static but historically contingent, 
politically charged and dynamic phenomena (Vaughan-Williams 2009, 1). 
For instance, Luiza Bialasiewicz (2012) examines the novel ways in which the 
European Union maintains its borders: something that stretches well beyond its 
external borders in the form of “outsourcing” migration controls to third states. 
Such fluidity of border management and the resulting reconfiguration of the 
EU sovereign space have grave implications for how sovereignty, territory and 
borders should be seen today. To put it more generally, the sovereign state and 
the modern state system do not exist a priori, but are only made possible through 
repeated practices by statespersons, diplomats, and intellectuals all performing 
according to shared Westphalian “rules of the game” as “background knowledge” 
(Biersteker and Weber 1996).
Based on the understanding of practice outlined above, one can examine 
how the political practices of securing borders and claiming sovereign territories 
will, in turn, constitute China’s identity and consequently its interests. Here, the 
works by William Callahan and Hiroyuki Tosa are useful. First, Callahan (2009; 
2010) takes maps and cartography as political practices that produce a nation’s 
geobody connecting space and people in a biopolitical manner.10 He draws on 
what Thongchai Winichakul (1994, 17) calls the “national geobody,” which is “not 
merely space or territory. It is a component of the life of a nation. It is a source of 
pride, loyalty, love, passion, bias, hatred, reason, unreason.” Callahan highlights 
how maps are themselves manifestations of the biopolitics of national identity 
practice (Anderson 2006). An example of this may be found in how the safety 
of the fishing communities in the South China Sea is constantly invoked and 
used as a justification for increased security (Roszko 2015). The historical irony 
here is that while many of these communities were not strictly confined to any 
particular sovereign territory in pre-colonial Asia, not only are they now firmly 
part of a state but they are also mobilized as the very “stuff ” of the “body politic” 
that needs to be defended at all costs. This is made further visible by the recent 
land reclamation projects, with a “population” firmly located on unambiguous 
“land” that needs to be protected. More than merely a scientific representation of 
a sovereign territory, therefore, maps have been part of a wider process of state 
building following the so-called “Western impact” in the region. Seen in this 
way, maps are deployed in the dynamics of cultural governance and resistance in 
China and Asia, where states seek to match territorial and cultural boundaries 
not only through military coercion but also through the management of identity 
practices (Callahan 2009, 144). Echoing studies on border politics, therefore, the 
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borders of China’s geobody are considered as not fixed but historically contingent, 
constantly produced and reproduced, and regarded as constitutive of political life.
Examples of geobody politics at play are the maps of China’s national 
humiliation, which link imperial China’s unbounded cartography and modern 
maps of sovereign territory. First published in China in the early twentieth 
century and subsequently reappearing after the Tiananmen Square incident (1989) 
as part of the patriotic education campaign, national humiliation maps were (and 
still are) produced for consumption in mass education to chart how China “lost 
territories” to imperialist aggressors (Callahan 2009, 146). It traces how the Qing 
dynasty’s imperial domain, carved up by Western and later Japanese aggression, is 
regained and transformed into the People’s Republic of China’s sovereign territory 
today. In contrast the spatial imagination in (South)East Asia was remarkably 
different before the colonial encounters, with overlapping, yet non-exclusionary, 
territorial claims, allowing the ambiguities and tensions to be suppressed in order 
to naturalize “national” boundaries.11 Callahan shows how this is then grafted 
onto the narrative of a “century of humiliation,” a master narrative that starts off 
with the Opium War (1840-42) and plots how the Chinese Communist Party 
has been the vanguard in fighting off imperialist aggressors and regaining the 
lost honor and pride of the Chinese people, ultimately achieving recognition as a 
great power (Westad 2012).12 Historical memory is thus mobilized to legitimize 
domestic authority and its external actions.
Yet the story does not end there, since the narrative goes on to suggest that it 
must recover all the “lost territory” of the imperial dynasty, including the South 
China Sea. Here is where the politics of the so-called nine-dash line appear, since 
the historically contingent demarcations on the maps suddenly emerge as clear-
cut sovereign territorial borders.13 Such narrative has spurred intense discussion 
between China and its neighbors, with countries such as Vietnam coming out 
with its own maps as historical evidence of its territorial claims.
Tosa (2014; 2012) develops Callahan’s arguments by drawing on insights 
from Critical Security Studies and Critical Border Studies. For Tosa, geobody is 
seen as a collective identity created through political practice (cartography) and 
strengthened by the performativity of borders. The performativity of borders 
means that borders are not just a demarcation line that separates existing 
sovereign territories, but a set of practices that constantly reinforce the inside/
outside distinction by chasing away the Others. To borrow a phrase from Noel 
Parker and Nick Vaughan-Williams (2009), borders are like “lines in the sand” —
in order for a border to be evident and recognized, it needs to be drawn over and 
over again like drawing a line in the sand. Thus, geobody is only made possible by 
repeated practices of border management and repetitive learning, for instance in 
the form of the national history of humiliation examined by Callahan (Tosa 2014, 
13-15). 
Rather than seeing the territorial disputes as a result of the shifting (material) 
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balance of power and unambiguous identities and interests, as in the geopolitical 
approach, therefore, intensified territorial disputes and its associated practices 
such as cartography, border management, and media representations (like 
weather forecasts that Chinese broadcasters now offer) should be seen instead as 
feeding into the identity formation of the Chinese state, strengthened by geobody 
politics, which in turn increases the possibility of conflict. It should also be noted 
that the dynamics of geobody politics is not unique to China but are exhibited 
throughout the region. The maritime disputes in Northeast Asia between Japan 
and China (Senkaku/Diaoyu), Korea and Japan (Dokdo/Takeshima) and Korea 
and China (Ieodo/Suyan Rock/Socotra Rock) are all igniting the buildup of 
geobody politics, intertwined with the politics of memory and emotions.14
Solitaristic Identity and the Risk of War
As outlined above, the limits of geopolitical perspectives include the assumption 
that states’ identities and interests are given. Accordingly, one would proceed to 
examine how these assumptions inform state actions. Yet it is precisely because 
of these assumptions that such analyses need to speculate where China’s “true” 
identity and intentions lie. One needs to turn the traditional equation on its head: 
to see how political practices constitute the identity and, consequently,   interests. 
Developing this line of argument, the following section explores the risks 
involved in a further escalation of tensions in the South China Sea and beyond. 
A useful starting point for such an exercise is David Campbell’s (1992) 
Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. For 
Campbell, identity is never fixed but constituted by difference: “The constitution 
of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries which serve to 
demarcate an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside,’ a ‘self ’ from an ‘other,’ a ‘domestic’ from 
a ‘foreign’” (Campbell 1992, 8). In other words, identity is always relational; 
identities of states are produced and reproduced in relation to others (such as 
other states). Campbell further draws on Charles Tilly’s distinction between 
“nation-state” and “national state,” whereby nation-states are “national states 
whose sovereign territorialization is perfectly aligned with a prior and primary 
form of identification, such as religion, language, or symbolic sense of self ” (ibid., 
11). This means that most states are actually “national states” —paradoxical 
entities that do not possess stable identities. Based on such understanding, 
Campbell examines how the interpretations of danger have worked, and continue 
to work, to establish the identity of the United States. In reading U.S. foreign 
policy texts from the Cold War, Campbell examines how danger came to be 
associated with communism and the Soviet Union. American identity is then 
defined as the polar opposite of the Soviets. Rather than seeing foreign policy 
as an expression of interests or values of a given state, therefore, Campbell 
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shows how foreign policy constitutes state identity through the interpretation of 
danger posed by others. The implication of this work is that the notion of danger 
goes beyond military threats of other states to incorporate cultural and even 
civilizational elements.
Popularized by Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilization” thesis, the end of 
the Cold War and the “emergence of identity politics” have reinforced the need to 
take identity politics seriously (Huntington 1996). Whereas the Cold War years 
were characterized by the pursuit of geopolitical/ideological aims, the post-Cold 
War period has seen an increasing number of situations in which violence arises 
from conflicting identities. Correspondingly, it has been suggested that the forms 
of conflict and violence have also shifted from traditional wars between states (or 
“old wars”) to new forms of organized violence. Mary Kaldor (2012) characterizes 
these “new wars” as intra-state, identity-driven, asymmetrical, and barbaric with 
no distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Rooted in a novel form 
of identity politics, these new types of wars are identity-driven and barbaric, 
which implies that “enemies” are now defined by membership in certain groups 
rather than their actual roles or actions. Violence is justified since the enemy is 
categorized as valueless and evil; hence, there is no need for hesitation. 9/11 and 
the following war on terror, it seems, has only exacerbated this tendency.15
Expanding on the relationship between identity and war, Kaldor (2013) goes 
on to argue that sectarian identity (ethnic, tribal or religious) should be seen 
more as an outcome of war rather than a cause of war. Drawing on Carl Schmitt’s 
notion of friend-enemy distinction as the basis of politics, Kaldor points out that 
such binary distinction is a consequence of a particular type of collaborative 
practice and specific mode of communication; in other words, the intensification 
of conflict and the real possibility of being killed due to one’s identity makes 
that identity important. An example is taken from the war in Bosnia: “Violence 
divided the Bosnian community into Serbs, Croats and Muslims. It established 
a dominant narrative of conflict that defined the identity of each side” (ibid., 
339; Campbell 1998). Kaldor goes on to argue that “political violence is a way 
of constructing a collective friend-enemy distinction and thereby underpinning 
the power of the collectivity” (Kaldor 2013, 341). The implication of such 
observations is that wars (or the threat of wars) are not some “contest of will” 
between adversaries in a traditional Clausewitzian sense, but one-sided and/
or parallel efforts to construct what Amartya Sen calls “unidimensional” or 
“solitaristic” political identities as the basis of power. While Kaldor explores a 
world where wars are “outlawed” and new forms of violence and insecurities 
(e.g., from natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes to man-made crises 
like financial crises and terrorism) are prevalent, and hence are able to shape 
identities, the reality of the South China Sea forces one to think in terms of both 
rational calculation of interests between states and political mobilization of 
historical memory that fuels identity formation.
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Rejecting Huntington’s view of an inevitable clash of civilizations, Sen (2006, 
xii) considers the limitation of a “solitarlist” approach to identity, which “sees 
human beings as members of exactly one group.” The problem with this approach, 
as displayed by the clash of civilizations view of the world, is that it ignores the 
multiple identities that human beings have, given their diversity of affiliations, 
attachments and affinities: 
The same person can be, without any contradiction, an American citizen, of 
Caribbean origin, with African ancestry, a Christian, a liberal, a women, a vegetarian, 
a long-distance runner, a historian, a school teacher, a novelist, a feminist, a 
heterosexual, a believer in gay and lesbian rights, a theater lover, an environmental 
activist, a tennis fan, a jazz musician, and someone who is deeply committed to the 
view that there are intelligent beings in outer space with whom it is extremely urgent 
to talk (preferably in English). (Sen 2006, xii-xiii)
Yet when such plural identities are suppressed and a singular identity 
imposed on us, it can breed violence, fostering sectarian or other divisions 
between people. Such risk of conflict can be further exacerbated, Sen (2008) adds, 
by economic inequality, poverty and injustice. While seeing political economy 
alone as the cause of global conflict is an oversimplification, Sen nonetheless 
argues that “some of the divisions between people linked with distinct racial or 
ethnic or other non-economic identities are made more tangible and serious 
through their association with poverty and inequality” (ibid., 15). 
Two implications can be drawn from this analysis. First, identity politics 
and the politics of interests are inevitably intertwined, and should be analyzed 
as such. It has been outlined that great power rivalry and the “threat of war” is 
intensifying territorial border politics, and this in turn, is fueling the dynamics of 
geobody politics. Politics of identity is therefore not just a matter of “nationalistic 
sentiments” that have the possibility of distorting the otherwise rational 
calculation of strategic interests, but is instead deeply rooted in the body politic. 
In such circumstance, challenging China in the UN tribunal under the auspices 
of the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea can invoke historical memories of 
Western imperial aggression (and its double standard use of international law), 
thereby hardening geobody politics.16 Of course, this does not mean that Beijing 
will (nor should) reject the legitimacy of the tribunal, but simply to suggest that 
it can be yet another ingredient in the historical narrative (self-)justifying its 
actions. In order to fully understand Chinese actions in the South China Sea, 
therefore, it is necessary to examine the geobody political dynamics operating in 
the background rather than simply applying a geopolitical view of a pursuit of 
economic interests or security maximization as its motive.
Second, in analyzing the prospects of peace and cooperation in the region, 
the dangers of solitaristic identities need to be taken into account. It has been 
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noted that the increase in maritime border disputes and a threat of conflict 
(and even war) are fueling geobody politics in China and other nations in the 
South China Sea. Such dynamics are further complicated by the fact that China 
is depicted as a “civilizational state” (Shih and Yin 2013), where the logic of 
modern sovereign states and the logic of the imperial tributary system are fused 
into one identity under a solitaristic discourse of “peaceful rise” or “peaceful 
development.”17 Obviously, while this is not to suggest that the modern Chinese 
state has been remade into a civilizational state on the lines of the great ancient 
dynasties, there is an element of suzerain logic collapsing into a Westphalian 
logic, as manifested in the nine-dash line.18 And within this fusion of logics, 
peaceful rise or peaceful development is not seen as a contradiction any more 
since, by definition, the dangers are brought in from the external Other. Thus 
although seemingly paradoxical, China’s peaceful rise and its “aggressive” actions 
in the South China Sea sit comfortably together when seen in this light.
Conclusion: Possibilities for Peace and Cooperation in the South 
China Sea and Beyond
There has been a flurry of recent publications on the historical analogies of 
contemporary (South)East Asia and Europe in 1914 (Krause 2014; Chong and 
Hall 2014; Rosecrance and Miller 2014). While such analogies look farfetched, 
the risks of miscalculations or even conflict in the South China Sea should not be 
ruled out. Rather than miscalculations emerging from the geopolitical strategic 
game of economic and security maximization based on a pre-conceived notion 
of national interests, however, this article has argued that a more profound 
risk involves the intensifying of identity (or geobody) politics surrounding the 
maritime disputes in the South China Sea and how this affects the strategic 
outlook, particularly of China. This is so, because geobody politics strengthened 
by the performativity of borders means that the more territorial claims become 
problematized, the more the so-called nine-dash line and the historical narratives 
that underpin it become naturalized from Beijing’s point of view; i.e., something 
that should be protected at all costs, even if that means resorting to force. And the 
consolidation of solitaristic identity in response to such threats of violence and 
war can be the most dangerous risk in the region, since the emergence of a friend-
enemy distinction can exacerbate the misunderstanding and miscalculations, 
resulting in the hardening of geobody politics that leads to more aggressive 
behavior. In fact, talk about a “risk of war” itself is fueling further political, 
military, discursive practices, in turn deepening identity politics in the region. In 
order to fully understand the reasons behind the seemingly contrasting messages 
being sent out Washington and Beijing, as seen in the introductory quotes, a 
renewed look at how identity (or geobody) politics is playing out is necessary to 
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complement the geopolitical analysis. This should also lead to greater awareness 
of the risks involved in a further escalation of tensions (whether physical or 
verbal) for peace and cooperation in the region, and more generally in East Asia.
As Yoshikazu Sakamoto once noted: “Violence is, itself, one form of a 
negative identity, since it deprives value from the Other, and is conducted under 
the assumption that ‘us’ and ‘them’ can be clearly distinguished” (Sakamoto 2015, 
461). In other words, violence happens when conflicting parties do not recognize 
each other’s identities and/or value them as meaningful when deciding their 
diplomatic positions towards one another. In order to de-escalate the tensions 
in the South China Sea, and to devise a way forward, what is needed is to seek 
what Sakamoto calls “positive identity,” or a collective identity that meaningfully 
connects the Self to the Other, and the Self to the Self. The first step towards 
such end may be to stop the wheel of geobody politics and the mobilization of 
historical memory, perhaps by learning from the successful experience of the 
German-Franco joint history textbook project (Durand and Kaempf 2014). 
Creatively imagining an “identification system” is needed: a collective identity 
that goes beyond any single nation/state towards a common Southeast Asian 
future.
Notes
1. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s comments at the 60th anniversary of the Chinese 
People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC). See Xinhua (2014).
2. U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s speech at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2015. 
See Carter (2015).
3. The “nine-dash line” refers to China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea; it 
encircles most of its waters, and includes the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands, and 
the Scarborough Reef. China has justified its claims mostly through “historical” evidence, 
though other parties have rejected such arguments. For instance, see U.S. Department of 
State (2014).
4. Also see the “Thucydides Trap Project” website: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
publication/25760/thucydides_trap_project.html (accessed November 13, 2015). The term 
has even been picked up by the Chinese President Xi Jinping (Valencia 2014).
5. Such a view, albeit a minority, has been taken up within the Chinese academia as well. 
See Yan (2011).
6. Such suggestions are not new. See Kennedy (1989) and Gilpin (1981).
7. By contrast, see Yan (2014).
8. For a recent overview of this “practice turn,” see Adler and Pouliot (2011), 
Kustermans (2016), and Bueger and Gadinger (2015). On its methodological implications, 
see Salter and Mutlu (2013) and Bueger (2014).
9. Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2015) and Vaughan-Williams (2009) provide useful 
overviews on the development of Critical Security Studies and Critical Border Studies.
10. On the effects of cartography on the development of the modern state system, see 
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Branch (2014).
11. It must be noted that the notion of the modern state equipped with sovereignty and 
territory was introduced only after the colonial encounter with the Europeans.
12. As Zheng Wang (2012) outlines, such selective use of historical memory (with history 
education as the instrument) has served the Chinese Communist Party well, particularly 
when it sought to replace traditional ideology of revolution and class struggle with 
nationalism as the ideological underpinnings of its legitimacy in the post-1989 era. Recent 
works on the “politics of humiliation” can provide useful insights to uncover the dynamics 
behind such narratives (Saurette 2006; Moisi 2009).
13. A similar race to use old maps and documents as historical evidence of the territorial 
claims can be found in North East Asia as well. For instance, compare the justifications put 
forward by the Korean government (http://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/eng/dokdo/reason.jsp) and 
the Japanese government (http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/position.
html) over Dokdo/Takeshima (accessed April 7, 2016).
14. On the politics of emotions, see Bleiker and Hutchison (2014).
15. This is not just a tendency of sectarian violence in the Middle East or Africa, but is 
found in the conduct of the “civilized,” as the Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib cases have 
shown. See among others, Danchev (2006) and Tagma (2009).
16. International law functioned as a mechanism distinguishing the “civilized nations” 
and the “barbarians” (and therefore not worthy of having an independent state) during 
colonial times. See among others, Kayaoglu (2010), Simpson (2004), and Anghie (2004).
17. The analysis of geobody politics can be combined with role theory, comparing the 
different “roles” that countries take or make. For instance, see Shih (2012). The author 
would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
18. While the nine-dash line was not the most serious problem during imperial times, 
when the boundaries of civilizations were not so rigid and had considerable overlaps, it is 
problematic to simply convert that to sovereign territorial boundaries. Also, the rise of the 
so-called “Chinese School” can be seen as a parallel development within the academia. For 
instance, see Wang and Buzan (2014).
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